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MAY AN ESTATE BE DEPRIVED OF ITS USUAL
INCIDENTS AT THE WILL OF THE
CREATOR?
It is proposed in this paper to examine the development of
the legal doctrine by which the owner of an estate, whether
large or small, may hold the property free from those incidents which usually attend the ownership of such estate. It
will be useful to preface this investigation by a statement of
the various kinds of freehold estates, with their incidents.
A. Estates in fee simple and absolute interests in personalty. The usual incidents of the ownership of such estate
may be classified as follows: (i) The power to alienate; (2) the
power to will; (3) devolution under the intestate laws, in case
the owner does not dispose of the estate in his lifetime or by
will ; and (4) the liability for debts.
B. Estates in fee tail. The only incidents with which we
are concerned are (i) power to commit waste, and (2) power
to bar the entail by fines and common recoveries.
C. Estates for life. The important incidents are: (i) the
power to alienate; (2) forfeiture for waste; and (3) liability for
debts.
(Estates for years are not separately classified because,
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so far as our purpose is concerned, they are governed by the
same principles as estates for life.)
This table is not intended as an exhaustive classification of
the incidents of estates. All that is intended to be expressed
by it is that, in the absence of any restrictive clause in the
instrument creating any one of these estates, it will have
attached to it by law the incidents mentioned. The problem
that then arises is: -low far may the creator of an estate by
express provision detach from the estate created all or any of
the incidents mentioned?
The earliest statement of the law is found in Lit. § 360.
"Also if a feoffment be made upon this condition, that the
fcoffee shall not alien the land to any, this condition is void,
because, when a man is enfeoffed of lands or tenements, he
hath power to alien them to any person by the law. For if
such a condition should be good, then the condition should
ou.t him of all the power which the law gives him, which
should be against reason, and therefore such a condition is
void." § 361 : "But if the condition be such that the feoffee
shall not alien to such a one, naming his name, or to any of
his heirs, or of the issues of such a one, etc., or the like, which
conditions do not take away all power of alienation from the
feoffee, etc., then such condition is good." § 362: "Also, if
lands be given in tail upon condition, that the tenant in tail
nor his heirs shall not alien in fee, nor in tail, nor for term of
another's life, but only for their own lives, etc., such condition
is good. And the reason is, for that when he maketh such
alienation and discontinuance of the entail, he doth contrary
to the intent of the donor, for which the statute of W. 2, Cap.
I, was made, by which statute estates in tail are ordained."
The effect of the doctrine of common recoveries upon the latter proposition is thus stated in Co. Litt. 223 b.: " But as to a
common recovery the condition is void, because this is no
discontinuance, but a bar, and this common recovery is not
restrained by the said statute of W. 2. And therefore such
condition is repugnant to the estate tail." And on the same
page, Lord Cope expresses his opinion about similar restrictions upon the lesser estates: "As if a man make a lease for
life or years upon condition that they shall not grant over the
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estate or let the land to others, this is good, and yet the grant
or lease should be lawful." It is noticeable in this earliest
statement of the law that no distinction is taken between forfeiture upon alienation and restraints upon alienation; the
illustrations are so concise that it is difficult to understand
whether they are examples of forfeiture or simply of restraint;
but in any event it is clear that Littleton's objection is the
same to (I) an estate in fee to A., with the proviso that if he
attempt to alienate, the estate shall vest in B., and to (2) an
estate in fee to A., with a proviso that he shall have no power
to alienate it.
It would have been the simplest way to deal with such conditions as are suggested above to say that they are void, because they are repugnant to the estate granted: that one cannot in one breath give A. an estate in fee simple and in the
next say that he shall not have the ordinary powers of an
owner in fee simple-that such a condition is repugnant to the
estate granted, and therefore void. And Pearson, J., in Re
RosIer, 26 Chan. Div. 8oi (1884), goes so far as to say: " I
confess I wish the law had been allowed to stand on the simple question of repugnancy, because then there would have
been no uncertainty and no confusion." Certainly there would
have been no uncertainty and no confusion, and the courts
would have been saved the solution of many nice questions,
but it does not follow that the law would have been more
beneficial. In law, as in morals, the easiest course is by no
means necessarily the best; if simplicity is the only argument
in favor of the repugnancy rule, it were wiser to revise the
present list of various kinds of estates, and add to it, for example, subdivisions of estates in fee simple, in one of which a
man might hold without power to alienate it, in another without liability for his debts, etc.
In fact, the authorities, from Littleton to the present time
are agreed that the repugnancy theory, though the simplest,
is not the true one; that an estate may be created without
the owner having all the usual powers of the possessor of
such an estate. Indeed, it might as well be argued that,
because an owner in fee simple has the natural right to erect
any building upon his land and use it as he chooses, provided
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he complies with the police laws of the state and does not
create a nuisance to his neighbor, it would be repugnant
and illegal to insert in a deed creating an estate in fee simple
a condition that the grantee should not erect a factory upon
the premises granted; and yet, of course, it is well settled
that such a condition is valid and binding, not only on the
grantee, but on his assigns. It is not true that such a grant
contradicts itself; the grantor does not first give a power and
then take it away, but on the contrary he never intends to
confer upon the grantee the power to erect a factory. And
precisely the same argument applies where the condition is
that the grantee shall not alienate; if the condition is to be
held void, it must be upon some other ground than that the
grantor has contradicted himself. Littleton's own illustration
of a cofidition in partial restraint of alienation being good
shows that the courts will recognize the power of a grantor
to deprive the estate in the hands of his grantee of certain of
its usual legal incidents. The question then arises, how far
may this be done?
It is submitted that the only principle, if it may be called a
principle, which governs such restrictions is public policy,
which is nothing more than the effort of the courts to apply
to the facts of a given case those principles of morality which,
though not embodied in statutes, are nevertheless recognized
as legally binding in the community. If it be objected that
this implies the power of judges to make the law, whereas
their province is to interpret it, it may be replied that this
power is the distinguishing and crowning feature of our
common law, as opposed to those systems of law which are
embodied in codes whose existence implies the non-existence, or at least the abolition, of any principle not contained
therein. In the field of contract law, a dozen illustrations
might be given of agreements which though not forbidden by
statute (at least originally) are yet forbidden or descimaged, in
various degrees, by the courts; such are those in restraint of
marriage. Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225, by a mortgagor to
waive his equity of redemption; Newcomb v. Bonham, I Vern.
7, agreements to restrict the liability of a common carrier,
(which, of course, are sustained in some jurisdictions), wager-
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ing contracts, Wilkinson v. Tousley, 16 Minn. 299; agreements
tending to encourage litigation, as maintenance, Findon v.
Parker, II M. & W. 682, or champerty, Prosserv. Edmonds,
I Y. & C. 499. Nor is this judicial legislation confined to
contract law. The history of the Rule against Perpetuities,
whose domain is the law of real property, is the most striking
example of its extent in the whole realm of law. Suggested
by Lord Nottingham, contrary to the opinion of all the law
judges, in Duke of Norfolk's case, 3 Ch. Cas. I,extended to
the case of infants in Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. temp. Talb.
228, and to a child en ventre salmere, in Long v. Blackall, 7
T. R. IOO,and to any number of lives in being in Thelluson v.
Woodford, ii Ves. 112; adding a fixed period of twentyone years regardless of infancy, in Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt.
393 ; 5 B. & Ald. 8o0; T. & R. 25, and taking its final modern
shape in Cadell v. Palmer, I Cl. & F. 372, the Rule against
Perpetuities has not only earned an admitted place among the
principles of real property law, but its value in prohibiting the
indefinite tying up of real estate is admitted by every one.
Nay, coming closer home, we find that the same objections
which have been made by the courts to contracts have been
made to conditions embodying the same idea when annexed
to grants of real estate. In Brown v. Peck, I Eden 14o, the
testator annexed to a gift to his niece a condition that it
should be cut down if she lived with her husband. The condition was disregarded as void. So also Wren v. Bradley, 2
De G. & S.49. Evidently, therefore, the question how far
an estate may be deprived of its usual legal incidents is simply
one of public policy; or, as Pearson, J., says in Re Rosher
supra: "It seems to me that, unintentionally and unwittingly,
another principle has been applied here (forgetting entirely
that the question whether a condition was good or bad
should be determined by its repugnancy to the prior gift), and
that the question of policy has been allowed to intervene,
omitting altogether all considerations of repugnancy. Just as
a general restraint of marriage was always held to be bad, but
a restraint of marriage to one particular individual was
always held, to be good, so, in the same way, although a
restraint of alienation in general was decided to be bad, it seems
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to have been thought that a restraint of alienation to one individual or his issue was not bad." Let us now examine the
authorities to see how far the courts have permitted legal incidents to be detached from the various estates.
Let us dispose of the simplest questions first, regardless of
the usual order of the val ious estates. It is, of course, familiar
that the creator of a life estate, may, if lie be so minded,
relieve the life tenant from all liability for waste; in fact, the
doctrine of equitable waste, or the imposition upon the tenant
for life without impeachment of waste, of certain duties to the
remainderman with respect to the preservation of the property
is one of the recent illustrations of judicial legislation. See
Vanev.Barnard,3 Vern. 738; Roltv. Somcrville, 2 Eq. Cas.Ab.
759 ; Litsington v. Boldero, 15 Beav. I,and Turner v. rright,
2 De G. F. & J. 234. The reason is clear. The public has no
interest, or at least only a very remote one, in the question
whether a life tenant may commit waste; if he were owner in
fee simple, of course he could destroy ad libitum, and, consequently, if the creator of his estate chooses to give him such
right, as the public' is indifferent, the remainderman cannot
object, because he only takes what the testator's bounty gives
him. If this is a correct statement of the principle, it would
seem to follow (though I know of no authorities) that (I) the
creator of the estate might, if he chose, relieve his life tenant
from liability for equitable waste also; and (2) the creator of
an estate tail might, if he chose, render the tenant in tail liable
to remaindermen for waste.
On the other hand, it is well settled that, although prior to
the Statute de Donis a condition against alienation by a tenant
in tail was valid, Anonymous Case, I Leon. 292, yet since the
statute, the policy of the law has changed, its purpose now is
to encourage the freedom of property, various methods of
barring entails have been devised, and such a condition is
therefore invalid: Zing v. Burchell, Amb. 379. So, as Lord
Coke said in the passage above quoted, a condition that tenant
in tail should not suffer a common recovery is invalid, and for
precisely the same reason. Indeed, it is just as obvious that
the public is interested in having land freely alienable, as that
the public is not interested in whether a life tenant may commit waste.
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This brings us naturally to a condition that tenant in fee
simple (or absolute owner of personalty) may not alien, and of
course, if the policy of the law requires that tenant in tail may
convert his estate into a fee simple so that he may a!ienate,
it also requires that the tenant in fee cannot be restricted
generally from alienating: Ware v. Cann, io B. & C. 433; Shaw
v. Ford,7 Ch. Div. 669; Re Dugdale, 38 Ch. Div. 176. Same
rule as to absolute ownership of personalty: Bradley v. Peixoto,
3 Ves. 324; Doe d. Norfolk v. Hawke, 2 East. 481. There is
one imp6itant exception, viz., that a married woman may
have an equitable fee in property settled to her sole and separate use, and yet be deprived of the power to alienate her
interest. Here the public interest in having property freely
alienable yields to what the law regards as the more important
consideration that the wife may enjoy the benefit of her separate estate free from the interference of her husband: Baggett
v. Meux, I Phil. 627; Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. 207.
When we leave estates of inheritance, however, and descend
to estates for life (or for years), we find both a change in the
policy of the law and (for the first time) a distinction between
forfeiture and restraint upon alienation. In accordance with
the foregoing principles we find that a proviso that a life
tenant may not alienate his interest is invalid, Brandon v.
Robinson, I Rose 197; Halze v. Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133;
Eltrisman v. Sener, 162 Pa. 577 (with, of course, an exception
as to a married woman, Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483); yet,
on the other hand, it is equally well settled that a gift over
upon alienation of a life tenant, or a gift to a tenant until he
die or alienate, is good, Rockford v. Backman, 9 Hare 475. It
is submitted that this distinction is not a sound one. If the
policy of the law is in favor of allowing every freehold tenant
to enjoy the power of alienating his estate, then the law ought
to hold invalid a provision like that in Rochford v. Hackman,
supra, forfeiting his estate for alienation ; if, on the other hand,
the public welfare will not be injured by preventing tenant for
life from alienating (as, of course, a tenant for years may be
prohibited from assigning), then it is hard to see why, in
Brandon v. Robinson, supra, the property should not be tied
up in the life tenant's hands, as well as forfeited upon his
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attempt to alienate. The law as it stands seems illogical. As
to which of the two logical views should be adopted, some
light is thrown by the cases which discuss the question how
far a man may settle property of his own, reserving a life
interest, with a proviso that if he alien, his interest shall terminate. In Plhipps v. Ennismore, 4 Russ. 131, such provision
was held invalid, on the ground that it is an attempt to invalidate one's own subsequent conveyance, and of course this
principle, if correct, would not assist our decision. In Brooke
v. Pearson, 27 Beav. 181, the provision was held valid, because
it happened that the subsequent mortgagee was not injured;
the decisions are reconcilable on the ground that such a provision is valid unless it injures the life tenant's own grantee. But
in Knig'ht v. Browne, 30 L. J. N. S. Ch. 649, Wood, V. C., expressly held such proviso valid. Finally, in Re Pearson, 3
Ch. Div. 807, such a proviso was held invalid, Knight v. Browne
being distinguished on the ground that the gift over to the
wife was part of a marriage settlement, but the decision is the
less satisfactory, because the condition also included a forfeiture upon the life tenant's insolvency, and the court held
that it operated as a fraud upon his creditors. The point is
evidently unsettled. Evidently, however, the cases just cited
assume that the restriction upon alienation by life tenant, if
created by a stranger, would be held valid, and on the whole,
this seems the sounder view. It is aided by the admitted rule
that the lessee for years may be prohibited from alienating,
and if no practical inconvenience has resulted from this, it is
likely that none will from applying the same prohibition to a
tenant for life. As to the case of the tenant for life having
created his own estate, the cases can perhaps be reconciled by
holding that such an arrangement is legally unobjectionable,
Brooke v. Pearson,supra, especially in favor of a wife, Knight
v. Browne, supra, unless its effect is to defeat either the tenant's
own grantee, Phipps v. Ennisinore,supra, or his creditors, Re
Pearson, supra; practically the exceptions will prove so
numerous that it would do no damage to admit the existence
of the rule.
Perhaps the present is the most appropriate opportunity to
advert to the question whether in this whole class of cases
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there is any distinction between conditions and limitations.
So far as conditions subsequent are concerned, there is apparently no distinction; a gift to A. and his heirs, until he alienate, and a gift to A. and his heirs with a proviso that if he
alienate, then to B. and his heirs, are precisely equivalent. A.
takes an absolute estate in fee simple in either case. But
suppose the illegal condition is precedent, as a gift to A. and
his heirs, provided he will live apart from his wife, or a gift to
A. and his heirs, so long as he lives apart from his wife. In Re
Moore, 39 Ch. Div. 116, held that under such a limitation as
the latter, A. would not hold, except during such time as he
lived apart from his wife, and yet, of course, the policy of the
law is just as much infringed uppn as in the former case,
where evidently the condition would be disregarded, Brown
v. Peck, supra. The decision in Moore's case is, however,
probably right; it seems impossible, as Kay, J., points out,
for the court to allow the beneficiary to take during the very
period when the testator has forbidden it; it would be both an
extension of his gift, and a hardship on the person who would
take by default. ' The obvious difficulty of these cases, however,
need not concern us. In the nature of things the attempt to
limit the incidents of an estate must necessarily be in legal
effect an estate with condition subsequent, and in the case of
such conditions, as we have seen above, the difficulty does not
arise. The distinction will, therefore, not be further noticed.
Turning from general restraints ot alienation to partial
restraints, we find the law to be in a state of confusion. In
Doe d. Gill v. Pearson,6 East 173, real estate was devised by
a testator to his two daughters, Ann and Hannah, in fee
"upon this special proviso and condition, that in case my said
daughters Ann and Hannah Collett, or either of them shall
have no lawful issue, that then and in such case they or she
having no lawful issue as aforesaid shall have no power to
dispose of her share in the said estates so above given to them
except to her sister or sisters, or to their children." Ann
died without having had any issue, but having shortly before
her death levied a fine to the use of her husband, Wait. Lord
Ellenborough held, in a somewhat unsatisfactory opinion, that
the fine was invalid, as she had no power to alienate to her
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husband; he relied upon Daniel v. Ubley, Jones 137, where a
devise" To a wife to dispose at her will and pleasure, and to give
to which of her sons she pleased" was thought by a majority
of the court to pass a fee simple with a valid condition
attached.; but it was not necessary to decide the point. The
case, if good law, goes a long way in sustaining partial restraints, as there were but two or three persons in existence
to whom under the terms of the gift Ann could alienate. In
Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. 330, a gift in fee was conditioned, "if sold at all it must be to one of his brothers hereafter
named." The condition was held invalid on the ground of
repugnancy, and because if such a restraint were permitted it
might readily be employed to evade the prohibition against alienation generally. But in Re Macleay, L. R. 2o Eq. 186, Jessel,
M. R., held valid a condition that the devisee "never sells it
out of the family," holding that a condition in partial restraint of
alienation was valid, and distinguishing Attwater v. At/water,
supra, on the ground that the court thought the restraint
in that case equivalent to a general restraint. In Re Rosher
26 Ch. Div. 8oi, a devise was made in fee,.with a condition
that if the devisce desired to sell, the testator's widow should
have the option to buy at a price which was so low that the
court thought it equivalent to a general restraint upon alienation, or at any rate to a restraint compelling a sale to a particular individual. The condition was held void. While the
case may be distinguished from in Re Macleay, supra, on the
ground that the condition amounted to a general restraint
upon alienation, yet Pearson, J., strongly criticises Jessel's
views, using an argument which will be hereafter referred to.
The American cases are equally uncertain. In Mc Williams v.
Nisly, 2 S. & R. 507, we find a dictum that a prohibition to
alienate to a particular individual is good, while in Anderson
v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506, a condition that the two sons who
were devisees should not alienate except to each other was
held invalid. As Pearson, J., said: "What am I to say is the
principle? Is it that there may be a condition that, if you
alienate, you must alienate to a member of your own family,
or that you must look to the number of the individuals to
whom the alienation is permitted, or when there are a number
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of individuals (not knowing at the present moment what the
number may be), am I to inquire whether they are able, or
likely to be willing, to purchase the property to which the
condition is attached? If they are able and willing to purchase the property, am I to say that the condition is good,
and if from their poverty they are unable, or if from other
circumstances are unwilling, am I to say that the condition is
bad? It seems to me that the adoption of any such rule as
that would produce the greatest uncertainty and confusion; in
fact it would be absolutely impossible for any judge to apply
such a rule to any case which might conie before him, unless
the facts of the case were absolutely identical with those of
some previously decided case."
But, as already urged, the difficulty of the problem is no
reason why it should not be faced and solved by the courts.
Holmes, J., in his Common Law, chap. 3, has pointed out
with great clearness and force how, as the law imposes upon
all the citizens the necessity of a knowledge of itself, so it
should by degrees more exactly and accurately define for the
benefit of its citizens those acts which have or may have
attached to them legal penalties. Perhaps the most striking
illustration of this function of the courts is the so-called
"stop, look and listen" rule, so familiar to lawyers in Pennsylvania. What it means is that the law is now able to say to
man who is about to cross a railway track, instead of, as
formerly, "You must take due care, and if the jury think you
have been negligent you cannot in any event recover," now
the law says, "You must stop, look and listen." In other
words, the unsatisfactory, because indefinite, standard of reasonable care, involving the somewhat complex conception of
a reasonable man, has been, in this class of cases, further
defined in concrete language which even a child could understand-and thelawis performing its function just so much more
adequately than heretofore. Let us examine, therefore, how
far public policy permits such partial restraints on alienation,
remembering that even Pearson, J., concedes that they are
permitted.
The only test suggested in the cases is that of Jessel, M. R.,
viz., "whether the condition takes away the whole power of

268

MAY AN ESTATE BE DEPRIVED OF ITS USUAL

alienation substantially; it is a question of substance, and not of
mere form." Pearson, J., while excepting to this principle, explains it admirably: " I apprehend that the meaning of the word
' substantially' is this: Does it really deprive the devisee of
the power of alienation, or does it only so restrain it. that in
effect he still has the power of alienation? If the latter, it is
good." Conceding with Pearson, J., that the test is vague
and difficult of application, still it is precisely the same question which arises in cases of building contracts, where the
plaintiff, though failing in some particulars, is yet entitled to
recover something if his contract has been substantially performed; substantial performance is difficult to define,-nay,
one jury may consider that performance substantial which
another would not so consider, but it is better for the doctrine
to exist in its defective form rather than resort to the simpler
but harsher rule of turning the plaintiff out of court if he has
not lived up to the letter of his agreement. A more scientific
and apparently very equitable principle is suggested by Professor Gray, "Restraints on Alienation," p. 41: "That a condition is good if it allows of alienation to all the world with
the exception of selected individuals or classes; but it is
bad if it allows of alienation only to selected individuals or
classes." This, of course, is not the law of England, since
in Re Mac/ay, supra: but the few decisions in America are in
accord with it, Anderson v. Cary, supra, Gallingerv. Farlinger,
6 U. C. C. P. 512, and it seems to afford a definite rule, by
furnishing a plainly marked line which meets with the public's
requirement that property shall on the whole be freely transferrable, and yet permits the grantor or testator to make an
exception in the case of an objectionable individual, just as,
he, of course, may make an exception against an objectionable
1
use.
I The Canadian cases follow the English rule: Earls v. McAlpine, 27
Grant's Ch. (U. C.) 161; Smith v. Faught, 45 U. C. Q. B. 484, In re Winstanley, 6 Ont. Rep. 315; O'Sullivan v. Phelan, X7 Ont. Rep. 732. The
leading American case advocating the doctrine of the invalidity of all partial restraints on alienation is Mandelbaum v. McDonnell, 29 Mich. 78;
accord Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 538; Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 314.
Some Massachusetts cases favor the English rule: Gray v. Blanchard, 8
Pick. 284; Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick. 43; Simonds v. Simonds,
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The next question is how far the creator of an estate in fee
may control the devolution of the estate upon the death of the
tenant in fee; it is here assumed that the tenant may, if he
choose, alienate the estate during his life, but the further consideration assumes that he has not done so. If not, may the
creator either (a) deprive the tenant of the right to devise it
altogether, or (b) conceding him the right to devise, provide
that in case of his failure to devise, the estate shall pass, not
under the intestate laws, but to persons designated by the
creator, as upon an executory limitation? The two phases
indicated will be considered together, as they are so treated in
the cases, although the principles governing them may be
found to be not identical. In Ware v. Cann, io B. & C. 433, a
testator devised an estate in fee to A., with a proviso that if
he died without heirs, or if he offered to mortgage, or suffer a
fine or recovery of it, then over to B. The latter proviso, of
course, is invalid, and the King's Bench must have thought
the former equally so, for they sent a short certificate to the
Chancery that A. could give a good title in fee simple. Like
most such certificates, the decision is unsatisfactory because
no reasons are given; but the case certainly denies the original testator's right to dispose of the estate in any way upon
the death of the tenant, for obviously if this limitation was
invalid, a condition impairing the power of the tenant in fee to
devise would be so afortori- it is a much greater infringement of such tenant's ordinary privileges. Precisely the same
question arose, and was similarly decided in Holmes v. Godson,
8 DeG. M. & G. 152, where Turner, L. J., said: "This is in
terms a disposition of real estate in favor of other devisees in
the event of a devisee in fee dying intestate; and I think that
such a disposition is repugnant and void. The law, which is
founded on principles of public policy for the benefit of all
who are subject to its provisions, has said that in the event of
an owner in fee dying intestate, the estate shall go to his heir;
3 Met. 562. The similar early New York case of Jackson v. Schutz, 18
Johns. x84, was overruled in De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y., 467. It
may be noted that the parallel question of how long the power of alienation the power of alienation may be restricted has been fixed by statute
in Michigan (2 How. Ann. Stat. 5531) at "two lives in being at the
creation of the estate." See State v. Holmes, 73 N. W. 548.
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and this provision tends directly to contravene the law, and
the policy on which it is founded." It will have been noticed
that the reason assigned is the repugnancy-which we have
already found not to be the true principle applicable to these
cases; and when we advert to the proper test of public policy,
it is by no means clear that public policy is injured by sustaining such conditions. Assuming that the owner in fee may
not be restricted from alienating, assuming further for
the moment (though we have not yet reached the cases>
that the same policy will invalidate a clause prohibiting
him from devising the land-yet his rights could hardly
be affected by a proviso that, if he does not sell,
and if he does not devise, then the estate shall go
over; if he wants his heirs under the intestate laws to
inherit in the proportions in which they would inherit under
those laws, he may accomplish his purpose by making a will
devising it to them in those proportions. The right to die intestate, so to speak, is a right whose very existence is questionable. While the law is probably settled by Holmes v.
Godson, and subsequent cases, it is submitted that it is upon
an illogical, or at any rate an inexpedient, foundation. Shaw
v. Ford, 7 Chan. Div. 669, is a similar case, the proviso being
in case the beneficiary died without issue-from which we may
understand that the testator intended to deprive him of the
power to devise-and, as intimated above, it may be readily
admitted that such a condition would be against public policy.
But no such distinction is taken by Fry, J., who in holding
the gift over invalid stands squarely upon the cases cited:
"Primafacfe, and speaking generally, an estate given by will
may be defeated upon the happening of any event; but that
general rule is subject to many and important exceptions.
One of those exceptions may, in my opinion, be expressed in
this manner, that any executory devise defeating or abridging
an estate in fee, by altering the course of its devolution, which
is to take effect at the moment of devolution, and at no other
time, is bad." Ross v. Ross, I Jac. & W. 154, is to the same
effect, and other cases might be cited, as Kaiker's Appeal, 6o
Pa. 141, and Fsher v. Wster, 154 Pa. 65, where the whole
learning on the subject is admirably reviewed by R. C. Dale,
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Esq., Master, whose report in favor of the English rule was
adopted by the Supreme Court. The only case involving
the denial of the right to devise alone is Doe d. Stevenson v.
Glover, I C. B. 44 8 : a gift in fee was here made by a testator
to his son A., with a proviso that if he should die without
leaving issue, or if he should not have disposed and parted
with his interest, then over to B. The son died without
issue, but made a will. B. claimed against the will. It was
held by the court that the executory devise to B. was valid;
that the intention of the testator was that A. should have
power to alienate in his lifetime only. "The son might have
prevented the devise ever from taking effect, by disposing of
the property in his lifetime. But in the event of his not exercising that power, the estate is given over and nothing remains for him to part with by his will." The case can hardly
be regarded as binding. It is flatly opposed to the cases just
cited, and on principle a prohibition to will lands would seem
to be as objectionable as a prohibition against alienation.
We come finally to the consideration of the question how
far the creator of an estate may exempt it from liability for
the payment of the debts of its owner. In spite of the great
conflict of authority on this point, some questions may be regarded as entirely well settled. The same public policy which
requires that an owner in fee may alienate generally, also requires that his estate shall be liable for the payment of his
debts. Nor does it matter whether the condition takes the
form of a limitation over upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of
the tenant, or executions issuing against him, or whether
it consists simply of a clause providing that the estate in his
hands shall be exempt from liability for his debts. In Re
Dugdale, 38 Ch. Div. 176, is a good illustration of the first
class of cases. A testatrix devised property to trustees, giving her son A. an equitable fee, and adding that if he should
"do, execute, commit or suffer any act, deed or thing whatsoever whereby or by reason or in consequence whereof, or
if by operation of law, he would be deprived of the personal
beneficial enjoyment of the said premises in his lifetime,"
then over. The court held that the executory gift over was
bad, Kay, J. saying: "The events upon which the executory

272

MAY AN ESTATE BE DEPRIVED OF ITS USUAL

devise in this case is to take effect seem to be (I) alienation,
and (2) bankruptcy, or judgment and execution. The alienation contemplated is any alienation whatever by the devisee,
not limited in any way. This is clearly invalid. With respect
to the other event, bankruptcy or judgment and execution
effect an involuntary alienation. Can a fee simple be divested
by an executory devise on that event? The liability of an
estate to be attached by creditors on a bankruptcy or judgment is an incident of the estate, and no attempt to deprive it
of that incident by direct prohibition would be valid. If a
testator, after giving an estate in fee simple to A, were to
declare that such an estate should not be subject to the bankruptcy laws, that would clearly be inoperative. I apprehend
that this is the test. An incident of the estate which cannot be
directly taken away or prevented by the donor cannot be taken
away indirectly by a condition which would cause the estate to
revert to the donor, or by a conditional limitation or executory
devise which would cause it to shift to another person. Peircyv.
Roberts, I M. & K, 4, is a case of the other class. A gift was
made to trustees in trust to apply the income to the use of the
testator's son, A. in such proportions, at such times and in such
manner as the trustees should think best. A took the benefit
of the Insolvent Debtor's Act, and it was held that his assignee
was entitled to the fund: "The insolvent being the only person substantially entitled to this legacy, the attempt to continue
in him the enjoyment of it, notwithstanding his inso vency, is
in fraud of the law. The discretion of the executors determined by the insolvency, and the property passed by the
assignment."
But probably the best statement of public
policy on this point is contained in the opinion in Mfebane v.
Mebane, 4 Ired. Eq. i3 1: there the testator had no hesitation
in expressing his wish that his son's equitable fee should "not
in any wise be subject to the debts " of the son. The estate
was nevertheless held liable to the son's creditors, Ruffin, C.
J., saying: "The doctrine rests upon these considerations:
that a gift of the legal property in a thing includes the jus
disponendi,and that a restriction on that right as a condition,
is repugnant to the grant, and therefore void: And that, in a
court of equity, a cestui que trust is looked on as the real
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owner, and the trust governed in this respect by the same
rules which govern legal interests; and, consequently, that it
is equally repugnant to equitable ownership that the owner
should not have the power of alienating his property......
That being so, it follows that the interest of the cestui que trust,
whatever it may be, is liable in this court for his debts. For
it would be a shame upon any system of law, if, through the
medium of a trust of any kind of contrivance, property, from
which a person is absolutely entitled to a comfortable, perhaps
an affluent support, and over which he can exercise the highest right of property, namely, alienation, and which upon his
death would uudoubtedly be assets, should be shielded from
the creditors of that person during his life. . . . Liability
for debts ought to be, and is, just as much an incident of
property as theJus disponendiis; for, indeed, it is one mode of
exercising the power of disposition." The court fell into an
error at the close of the opinion, through overlooking the distinction which has grown up in this particular between estates
in fee simple and life estates: "The only manner in which
creditors can be excluded is to exclude the debtor also from
all benefit from, or interest in, the property, by such a limitation, upon the contingency of his bankruptcy or insolvency, as
will determine his interest, and make it go to some other person." Not only is this generally true, but even in states like
Pennsylvania, where spendthrift trusts are recognized as to
equitable life interests, it seems to be conceded that equitable
fees are liable to creditors: Keyser's Ap., 57 Pa. 236. Beck's
Est., 133 Pa. 51, indeed goes so far as to hold valid a
condition that a legacy shall not be attachable in the hands of
the executor, and Barker's Est, 159 Pa. 518, holds that a
spendthrift trust clause is valid to protect the interest of an
equitable tenant in fee until his right to possession accrues
(thus coming pretty close to the holding that an equitable fee
may be protected by a spendthrift trust clause). But the latter case expressly recognizes the authority of Keyser's Ap.,
supra, and therefore it may be confidently asserted that even
in Pennsylvania the general rule still prevails.
Turning to the lesser estate for life, we again find that a
distinction has been taken between a gift for life with a limita-
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tion or condition that upon the insolvency of the life tenant
the estate shall go, over or revert (where the condition or limitation has been held valid) and a gift for ie with a proviso
that the estate in the life tenant's hands shall not be liable for
his debts, when the proviso (o far as legal life estates are
concerned) has universally been held bad. An illustration of
the first class is Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Stra. 947. Here an
estate was given to trustees for the use of A. for life, and if he
failed, then for the use of his wife and children. The gift over
was held good, the court comparing it to the case of a lease in
which the tenant is prohibited from assigning his interest, and
thinking that creditors should not complain, because the donor
may give to the bankrupt on what terms he chooses. The
same principle was acted on in Dommett v. Bedford, 6 T.
R. 684, and in a long opinion by Turner, V. C., in Rockford v.
Hackman, 9 Hare, 475, where Lord Eldon's opinion in Brandon v. Robinson, i8 Ves. 429, is relied on as establishing the
distinction between this and the latter class of cases. It is
conceded, however, that a man may not settle his own property upon himself for life with a limitation over in the event of
his own insolvency. This was first intimated in Higinbotham
v. Holme, 19 Ves. 88 (which, however, partly turned upon the
question of actual fraud), and was expressly decided in Lester
v. Garland,5 Sim. 205. See also Synge v. Synge, 4 Ir. Ch.
337. Of the latter group of cases, Graves v. Dolphin, i Sim.
66, is perhaps the earliest example; a proviso that an annuity
should be exempt from liability for the annuitant's debts was
held void. The law is well settled: Younghusband v. Gis orne,
i Coll 4oo; and applies even where a trust is created, if the
cestui que trust is also trustee, so that he has the legal title :
Hahn v. Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133; hrisman v. Sener, 162 Pa.
577.
It is of course too late, except by legislative enactment, to
alter so well-settled a distinction, and yet it seems on principle very questionable whether such a distinction is well
founded. It would seem much more consistent and logical
for those courts which sustain spendthrift trusts to hold that,
as the policy of the law is not opposed to a life tenant holding
his property free ,from his debts, not only is a gift ever con-
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ditional upon his insolvency valid (Rochford v. Hackman,
supra), but that a direct legal estate for life might equally be
made exempt from liability for debts: why should public
policy insist upon the formality of a trust? On the other
hand, it would seem that these courts which condemn spendthrift trusts, should not only condemn a clause exempting a
legal life estate from liability for debts (Graves v. Dolphin,
supra), but also should hold invalid a clause providing for a
gift over upon the life tenant's becoming insolvent-just as
they of course would hold invalid a clause providing for a
gift over in favor of the criminal upon the life tenant's being
murdered ; in the latter case they would not hesitate to subordinate the testator's wishes to considerations of public policy
-why should they in the former, and thus allow their aversion of spendthrift trusts to be evaded, by simply providing
that, upon the life tenant's insolvency, the estate shall vest
in (say) his wife and children? The very fact that according
to all the decisions a man may not create a life estate for himself determinable upon his insolvency (Lester v. Garland,
supra), is a strong argument in favor of this view; leaving
actual fraud out of the case, and assuming that the man is
amply justified in laying aside a given sum of money, why
should he not be permitted to treat it the same as a stranger?
If he may give it away absolutely, as of course he may, why
may he not do the less harmful act, so far as his creditors are
concerned, of reserving an equitable life interest for himself,
and if he may do so, why may not (fraud again excepted) that
life interest be determinable upon the same event which would
terminate his life interest created by a stranger ? In fact, the
futility of the distinction is proven by the fact that, in the illustration just suggested, the man of means might make a gift
outright to a friend, and the friend might immediately settle
the same sum upon trustees, giving the donor a life estate
determinable upon his insolvency; what merit has a distinction that could be so readily evaded ?
These considerations lead us naturally to the much discussed
problem whether, admitting that an equitable fee may not be
exempted from liability, admitting likewise that a legal life
estate may not be so exempted, admitting finally that the or-
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dinary equitable life estate is not so exempted, yet may an
equitable life estate be created in such a way that because of
the creator's expressed wish, the life tenant may hold the estate free from such liability? It is not proposed to narrate the
conflicting views on this subject. Every lawyer knows that
such trusts are not sustained in England, and in many of our
states. Tillinghast v. Bradford,5 R. I. 205, is often cited as
the leading case in support of this view. The court said:
"Such restraints are so opposed to the nature of propertyand so far as subjectedness to debts is concerned, to the honest
policy of the law,-as to be totally void." Every lawyer knows,
too, that the decisions supporting spendthrift trusts originated
in Pennsylvania in Fisherv. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33, and that the
doctrine, though endangered for awhile (Overman's Appeal,
88 Pa. 276), is now well settled, not only in Pennsylvania, but
inmany other states, including Massachusetts (where the important case of Broadway Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 17o did
much to establish the doctrine), and that the Supreme Court
of the United States even went out of its way to express its
adherence to the so-called American doctrine (Miller, J's
opinion in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S.716). Professor Gray's
"Restraints on Alienation," written, as the author says, for
the express purpose of combatting spendthrift trusts, so far
from accomplishing its purpose, seems simply to mark a period
of their new activity. It is proposed simply to examine the
various arguments that have been adduced for or against
them.
It is hoped that enough has been said to show that repugnancy has nothing to do with the question,--that it is simply one
of public policy. It should be further borne in mind that
public policy has universally decided against permitting estates
in fee simple, whether legal or equitable, to be held free from
liability for the owner's debts, and that the same rule universally exists with respect to legal life estates ; the only question
is as to equitable life estates. The earliest argument in favor
of such spendthrift trusts is found in Fisher v. Taylor, 2
Rawle 33. Smith, J., said: "A different construction would make
the beneficial interest, which the testator intended to provide
for his son, subject to be sold for his debts, when he expressly
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declared that it should not be so subject, and would thus set
up a new will in place of that which it affected to interpret."
In other words, the testator's wishes must be respected; and
this argument has been reiterated through the cases. It would
be an affectation to cite cases to show, however, that when
you have determined the testator's intention, you have simply
reached the difficulty, not solved it; of course, the testator's intention must be disregarded wherever it comes in conflict with
the policy of the law. The fact that, in spite of the testator's
intention, an equitable fee is always liable for the owner's debts
is conclusive upon this point. Abandoning this ground, the
supporters of spendthrift trusts next argue that creditors are
the only persons who can complain, and they may not because
they have constructive notice through the recording of wills
and deeds of the terms of such trusts, and should not give
credit upon the faith of such estates : Miller, J., elaborates the
argument at length in Nichols v. Eaton,supra, and relies upon
the analogy of exemption laws which exist in every State.
And Morton, C. J., in Broadway Bank v. Adams, supra, adds:
"There is the same danger of their being misled by false apappearances, and induced to give credit to the equitable life
tenant when the will or deed of trust provides for a cesser or
limitation over in case of an attempted alienation, or of bankruptcy or attachment, and the argument would lead to the
conclusion that the Euglish rule is equally in violation of
public policy." It may be remarked, in passing, that so far
from proving that spendthrift trusts are valid, C. J. Morton's
view is a valuable argument in favor of the position advanced above that estates terminating upon insolvency should
be held invalid just like estates attempted to be created free
from liability for the owner's debts. But reverting to Justice
Miller's proposition, we must take issue with both branches
of it and deny (i) that the public has always constructive
notice of the terms of such trusts; and (2) that the cestui que
trust's creditors are the only persons who may complain of
spendthrift trusts. As to the first, while it must be conceded
under the laws of the various States, that both wills and deeds
of real estate are bound to be registered, where the public may
examine them, yet there is no such requirement with respect
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to deeds of personalty; and it is a well-known fact that many
spendthrift trusts are created of personalty by deed inter
vivos. It is not true, therefore, that the creditor may always
protect himself. Passing this point, however, and assuming
for the sake of argument that all creditors have constructive
notice of all such trusts, we come to the much more important
denial that the creditors are the only persons who may complain.
The community as a whole is much interested in the question
whether a man may be allowed to enjoy property without subjecting it to liability for his debts: what is the natural
tendency of such spendthrift trusts ? Is it not to encourage
in the beneficiary a feeling of irresponsibility-a feeling that
the property is being cared for by a presumably competent
trustee, and that he need not only give it no attention but if
the income is sufficient, live in idleness and luxury, knowing
that as long as he lives he will be comfortably supported ?
The difference between this and the ordinary trust estate is
obvious-in the latter the beneficiary's interest is as liable to
execution, principal and income, as if it were in his own hands.
Suppose any considerable part of the trust funds of the country were so safeguarded, does any one doubt that the result
would appear in an incompetent and lazy generation ? And.
if so, who would weigh for a moment the wishes of the creator
of the trust as against the interests of the community ? These
arguments have a special weight at the present time. For
what is the essence of the vague, but rapidly growing, feeling
against "trusts," so-called? Is it not that they permit capi-

tal to influence and interfere with the rights of liberty, as understood by the Anglo Saxon race? And is the right to
compel a man to yield up his possessions for the payment of
his debts at all less inherent and less valuable, than the right
to trade unrestricted by anything except by natural competition ? If conferences are held and political parties forming,
to assert the latter right, may we not feel confident that they
will likewise attack the former? Let our courts beware lest
unconsciously in sustaining spendthrift trusts they may be
creating another bone of contention in the impending controversy between labor and, capital, rich and poor.
The writer does not lay claim to any originality of -re-
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search in this paper. He will be quite satisfied if he shall
have demonstrated that the questions discussed herein are all
not questions of repugnancy at all, but questions of public
policy, and therefore to be resolved by the courts, not upon
strict logical analysis and deduction, but upon a consideration
of the ultimate highest good of the community.
Reynolds D. Brown.

